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When Fast-Tracking Slows You Down:
Reconsidering Nationwide Permit 12
Use for Large-Scale Oil Pipelines
Megan Rulli*

ABSTRACT
The consumption of oil pervades everyday life in America.
The network of pipelines transporting oil from field to consumer
is largely invisible. Until a major news event bursts pipelines onto
headlines, this indispensable and invisible system fuels the country without fanfare. At the same time, concern over global climate change has made new large-scale projects for fossil fuel
extraction and consumption highly controversial. The Keystone
XL (“KXL”) pipeline was originally designed to transport crude
oil extracted from oil sands in Canada to the Gulf of Mexico for
international export. After more than a decade of false starts, the
project currently sits dormant.
This Comment uses the battle over the KXL to illustrate the
federal framework of interstate oil pipeline regulation in the
United States. It examines the preliminary regulatory hoops required for construction and the energy policies gatekeeping key
permits. At the heart of the KXL controversy is the United
States Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Corps”) permitting program
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. This Comment critically examines whether the regulatory path of the KXL was appropriate. The KXL sought to fast-track construction by using
the Corps’ Nationwide Permit 12, but legal challenges to that
permit halted the KXL’s construction.
This Comment ultimately recommends that the Corps and
the fossil fuel industry stop relying on Nationwide Permit 12 for
large-scale pipeline projects. Pipelines longer than 250 miles
should instead be individually permitted. Individual permitting
would trigger review under the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”), the bedrock environmental law that examines direct and indirect environmental impacts of major federal actions.
* J.D. Candidate, Penn State University Dickinson Law, 2022
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Comprehensive NEPA review would promote transparency
through public input and give the federal government an important foothold in combatting climate change.
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INTRODUCTION

The proposed Keystone XL pipeline, to the chagrin of its proponents, has never been just a pipeline.1 Instead, the Keystone XL
(“KXL”) embodies the cultural debate over climate change and energy policy in the United States.2 Environmentalists and climate activists used the KXL to turn the amorphous threat of climate
change into a physical reality.3 These groups raised instant and prolonged opposition at each stage of the KXL’s construction.4 The
goal to halt the KXL became a movement.5
Oil pipeline construction in the United States is a lengthy process particularly ripe for challenge because federal oil pipeline regulation is fragmented.6 Construction authorizations are spread over
many agencies with multiple permitting programs.7 This fragmentation regularly delays pipeline construction and leaves projects vulnerable to legal actions at each step.8 This Comment focuses on the
federal authorization required for pipeline water crossings. In 2019,
the movement against the KXL targeted Nationwide Permit 12
(“NWP 12”), the required permit for the pipeline’s water crossings.9
Meant to streamline construction, the KXL’s use of NWP 12 likely
proved fatal.10 An early 2020 injunction against the KXL’s NWP 12
permits delayed construction long enough to miss the 2020 construction season.11 And in January 2021, in one of the first acts of
his administration, President Biden withdrew the KXL’s preliminary permit, terminating construction altogether.12
1. See Ted Hamilton, The Virtues of Uncertainty: Lessons from the Legal Battles Over the Keystone XL Pipeline, 18 VT. J. ENV’T L. 222, 251 (2016) [hereinafter
Hamilton].
2. Id.
3. See Keystone XL Pipeline Political Timelines, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
bit.ly/34oESdR [perma.cc/PZ9L-6RXB] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 8 (2016).
7. See id.
8. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 224.
9. See N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 454 F. Supp. 3d
985, 986 (D. Mon. 2020).
10. See Emily Pontecorvo, This Federal Permit Used to Fast-Track Pipelines.
Now it’s Threatening Them., GRIST (July 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3jrJruk [https://
perma.cc/9RWU-KBX3].
11. See Rod Nickel, Explainer: What is Happening with the Keystone XL Oil
Pipeline?, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2020), http://reut.rs/3teDNRt [https://perma.cc/
L7WH-ML6R].
12. Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
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While the KXL may be dormant, the controversy surrounding
it remains active.13 The next major pipeline proposed, or perhaps a
revival of the KXL, will raise the same climate change debate.14
This Comment considers NWP 12’s impact on the KXL’s demise
and its suitability for large scale pipelines moving forward. The history of the KXL and the current structure of federal oil pipeline
regulations lay the backdrop for the analysis. This Comment then
evaluates the recent shift of the Army Corps of Engineers to rely on
NWP 12 for individual water crossings rather than completing
whole pipeline environmental review.15 Finally, the Comment examines whether the federal government, through existing regulatory structures, could use whole pipeline review as a tool in fighting
climate change.
II. BACKGROUND
The battle over the KXL began over a decade ago.16 Controversial since its inception, the crude oil it would transport is a symbol of dirty fossil fuel dependence in a country struggling to address
global climate change.17 This section outlines the history of the
KXL.18 To understand the controversy surrounding the pipeline, it
is necessary to understand the pipeline itself.
A. The Saga of the Keystone XL Pipeline
The KXL is a proposed crude oil pipeline that aimed to transport hundreds of thousands of barrels of crude oil daily, in a direct
line from oil deposits in Canada to refineries along the Gulf of
Mexico.19 The KXL would be an upgrade and expansion of an already-existing Keystone Pipeline System, which currently stretches
from Hardisty, Alberta, to the Gulf Coast of Texas.20 The builder
13. See, e.g., Christopher Vondracek, Trump Talks Keystone XL in Return to
Stage, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Feb. 28, 2021), http://bit.ly/38eGd9S [https://
perma.cc/XK9G-FHT8].
14. See Hamilton, supra note 1, at 285.
15. See Alexander S. Arkfeld, Nationwide Permit 12 and Domestic Oil Pipelines: An Incompatible Relationship?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1991, 2004 (2017) [hereinafter Arkfeld].
16. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE KEYSTONE XL PROJECT, S-2 (2019) [hereinafter SEIS].
17. Brad Plumer, 9 Questions About the Keystone XL Pipeline Debate You
Were Too Embarrassed to Ask, VOX (Sept. 22, 2015), https://bit.ly/3jzMfVv [https:/
/perma.cc/Z8QY-U47C].
18. SEIS, supra note 16, at S-2 TO S-3.
19. Melissa Denchak, What is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2017), https://on.nrdc.org/2GnRREH [https://perma.cc/65NU-2YP9].
20. Id.
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and operator of the KXL and Keystone Pipeline System is TC Energy.21 If completed, the KXL would be approximately 1,209 miles
long and run from Canada in Hardisty, Alberta, to Steele City, Nebraska.22 It would pass through Alberta and Saskatchewan; cross
the United States-Canada border in Montana; then traverse Montana, South Dakota, and finally Nebraska; where it would connect
into the existing Keystone Pipeline System.23
The KXL pipeline would be a 36-inch diameter pipe able to
transport 830,000 barrels of crude oil per day.24 That quantity
would be a dramatic increase in capacity over the Keystone Mainline pipeline, which the KXL would replace.25 The source of crude
oil is one of many reasons why the pipeline is so controversial––the
crude oil is extracted from oil sands, also known as tar sands.26
1. “The Dirtiest Fossil Fuel on the Planet”
Oil extracted from oil sands has the infamous reputation of being “the dirtiest fossil fuel on the planet.”27 Oil sands earn this reputation because they create greater carbon emissions per barrel
than most other crude oils.28 Oil sands formations are unique.29
They are not found in deep geological formations, but are located
close to the surface and are “a mixture of sand, water, clay and a
21. SEIS, supra note 16, at S-1. TC Energy was formerly TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P. Melissa Denchak, What is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES.
DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2017), https://on.nrdc.org/2GnRREH [https://perma.cc/
FU27-8EM7].
22. Id.
23. Terminated Pipeline Route, TRANSCANADA PIPELINES LTD., https://bit.ly/
3ofqn4F [https://perma.cc/W82F-UKQE] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021); SEIS, supra
note 16, at S-1.
24. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, RECORD OF DECISION AND NATIONAL INTEREST
DETERMINATION: TRANSCANADA KEYSTONE PIPELINE, L.P. APPLICATION FOR
PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT 2 (2015).
25. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R42611, OIL SANDS AND THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 14 (2014). The current Keystone Mainline pipeline is a 30-inch diameter pipeline with “a capacity of nearly 600,000” barrels of
crude oil per day. Id.
26. Melissa Denchak, What is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Apr. 7, 2017), https://on.nrdc.org/2GnRREH [https://perma.cc/E8GK-V7KT].
27. See Rafi Letzer, The Keystone XL Pipeline, Which Trump Just Advanced,
Will Carry the Dirtiest Fossil Fuel on the Planet, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2TrWfp9 [https://perma.cc/XP5U-7ZJ4].
28. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R42611, OIL SANDS AND THE KEYSTONE XL PIPELINE: BACKGROUND AND SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 25 (2014).
29. What are the Oil Sands?, CANADA’S OIL & NAT. GAS PRODUCERS, https://
bit.ly/322luDt [https://perma.cc/ZEF4-UQ9K] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
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type of oil called bitumen.”30 Despite being closer to the surface, oil
extracted from oil sands is more costly than extraction from other
sources.31 These extra costs arise because oil must be separated
from the sands and refined before market.32
The extra effort to extract oil from oil sands is also more energy intensive.33 An operator’s method of extraction depends on
the depth of deposits.34 Surface mining is used for deposits less than
200 feet deep, while “in situ recovery” is used to reach deeper deposits.35 Both methods are more energy-intensive than conventional oil recovery methods,36 and carbon dioxide emissions from a
gallon of oil extracted from tar sands outpace those from a gallon of
conventional gasoline by 15 percent.37
The KXL would originate in the Athabasca River region in Alberta, the largest oil sands deposit known in the world.38 The deposit has the potential to produce 174.5 billion barrels of oil.39
Because the proposed KXL is key to transporting oil sands oil into
the global market, it is entwined in a larger national conversation
about climate change and dependence on fossil fuels.40
30. Id.
31. Oil Extraction, CANADA’S OIL & NAT. GAS PRODUCERS, https://bit.ly/
3q7V8u9 [https://perma.cc/67DJ-VNKP] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
32. Id.
33. See Rachel Nuwer, Oil Sands Mining Uses Up Almost as Much Energy as
It Produces, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), https://bit.ly/2G0PW8Y
[https://perma.cc/NWA3-6RCN] (citing studies showing the energy return in relation to energy invested in extracting oil sands oil is 5:1 through surface mining and
2.9:1 using in situ recovery, while the average for conventional oil is 25:1.).
34. See id. for a thorough description of extraction methods. In brief: surface
mining consists of shoveling out the sands, removing and crushing them, mixing
them with hot water and finally “pump[ing] by pipeline to a plant called an upgrader, where the bitumen (oil) is separated from the other components such as
sand, clay and water.” Id. In contrast, in situ recovery separates oil from sands
within the deposit itself by “heating the bitumen so it becomes fluid enough that it
can be pumped to the surface” through drilled wells. Id.
35. Oil Extraction, CANADA’S OIL & NAT. GAS PRODUCERS, https://bit.ly/
322luDt [https://perma.cc/VUD5-CFHV] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
36. See Rachel Nuwer, Oil Sands Mining Uses Up Almost as Much Energy as
It Produces, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2013), https://bit.ly/2G0PW8Y
[https://perma.cc/R9NY-NTQN] (comparing the energy used to extract oil from oil
sands with the energy produced from that source).
37. What Are Tar Sands?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://bit.ly/37PwJTr [https://perma.cc/FLQ6-B6TC].
38. Holli Riebeek, Mining Canada’s Oil Sands, NASA (Dec. 13, 2011), https://
go.nasa.gov/2HsiVU7 [https://perma.cc/RXB4-Y4TE].
39. Id.
40. Id.
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2. Presidential Permitting Problems
a. Presidential Permits and Border Crossings
The KXL required permission from the United States government to begin construction.41 Specifically, pipelines that cross an
international border require special authorization in the form of a
presidential permit.42 The State Department issues presidential permits for cross-border pipelines like the KXL that carry petroleum
products and hazardous liquids.43
The State Department’s presidential permitting process is full
of broad discretion and centers around a finding that the project
“serves the national interest.”44 Executive Orders (“E.O.”) 11423
and 13337 create the presidential permitting process for the State
Department to follow, but they do not define “national interest.”45
Instead, those E.O.’s offer general directives.46 The E.O.’s require
the State Department “to refer the application and pertinent project information to and request the views of” other agency heads
such as the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Secretary of Energy.47 Environmental effects of cross-border projects are evaluated by the State Department at the presidential permitting stage.48
41. LINDA LUTHER & PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44140,
PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT REVIEW FOR CROSS-BORDER PIPELINES AND ELECTRIC
TRANSMISSION 1 (2017).
42. Id. A Congressional Research Service report details the source of the
President’s authority to grant these permits: “Lower federal courts have held that
the President’s authority to issue such permits derives from Article II of the Constitution, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to include the power to conduct the nation’s foreign relations.” BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 10 (2016).
43. LINDA LUTHER & PAUL W. PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44140,
PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT REVIEW FOR CROSS-BORDER PIPELINES AND ELECTRIC
TRANSMISSION 6 (2017).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The other agency heads that must be consulted are the “Attorney
General; Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; the Secretaries
of Defense, the Interior, Commerce, Transportation, Energy, and Homeland Security, or the heads of those departments or agencies with relevant authority or
responsibility over relevant elements of the proposed project.” Id.
48. Id. This environmental review is completed pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which requires federal agencies to analyze the
environmental effects of “major federal actions.” Id. The scope of the anticipated
impact determines the level of environmental review. Id. Agencies prepare Environmental Impact Statements (“EIS”) for “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. If the agency is uncertain whether a
proposal would have significant impacts, it may prepare an environmental assess-
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Yet, as the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) notes in a
survey of presidential permits and their methods, the E.O.’s do not
direct the State Department to evaluate specific factors before issuing a presidential permit.”49 Despite any confusion this murky process may cause for applicants, presidential permits are rarely
denied.50 Indeed, the State Department can include in the issued
permit any conditions it deems necessary to ensure the project
serves the national interest.51
The KXL project stretched the boundaries of the State Department’s discretion. Typical projects subject to presidential permits
are confined to the border itself.52 Only the KXL and one other
pipeline cross the border and continue hundreds of miles into the
United States.53 The State Department’s review of the KXL’s environmental effects and its national security justification eventually
spanned three administrations and lasted more than a decade.54
Given the discretion involved in the presidential permitting process,
it is unsurprising that the fate of the KXL’s authorization rested on
the energy policy of the administration in power.
b. The Obama Administration
TC Energy filed its original application for the KXL with the
State Department in September 2008, at the tail end of George W.
Bush’s administration.55 This filing initiated a national interest evaluation as well as an environmental review of the pipeline’s construction.56 The Obama administration’s State Department denied
ment (EA) to determine if an EIS is necessary, or a finding of no significant impact
(FONSI) may be issued.” Id. Agencies can also predetermine categories of actions
that have “no significant effect on the environment,” negating a need for an EIS or
EA—known as categorical exclusions (“CE”). LINDA LUTHER & PAUL W.
PARFOMAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44140, PRESIDENTIAL PERMIT REVIEW FOR
CROSS-BORDER PIPELINES AND ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION 6 (2017).
49. Id. The report notes that the State Department considers “the proposal’s
potential effect on energy security, environmental and cultural resources, the economy, and foreign policy” as factors in its national interest determination. Id.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id. at 1.
53. Id. The Alberta Clipper, constructed by Enbridge Energy, is the other
pipeline. Id. Additionally, the KXL stands out as a rare project that was initially
denied a presidential permit. Id. at 3. The CRS described the norms of the process,
stating, “the permitting process is generally used to determine how a project must
be implemented to comply with federal law (and meet the national or public interest standard) rather than whether it can be implemented.” Id.
54. See SEIS, supra note 16, at S-2 to S-3 for a detailed timeline of the KXL
permitting and review process.
55. Id. at S-2.
56. Id.
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the presidential permit application in January 2012.57 The State Department based its denial on the grounds of insufficient time to
make the determination, primarily because Congress had enacted a
60-day deadline in an attempt to force the administration to speed
up the project’s approval.58 The denial also referenced an environmental concern, specifically the desire to consult with interested
parties to reroute the project to avoid “the uniquely sensitive terrain of the Sand Hills in Nebraska.”59 This denial explicitly left the
door open for TC Energy to submit another permit application
once the Congressional deadline passed.60
TC Energy refiled its application in May 2012, rerouting
around the Sand Hills.61 Following public hearings, agency and
tribe consultation, and evaluation under an Environmental Impact
Statement, the KXL’s presidential permit was again denied in November 2015.62 Secretary of State John Kerry issued the rejection,
which focused on the implications that the KXL held for climate
change and the future of America’s energy policy.63 Secretary
Kerry explained, “The critical factor in my determination was this:
moving forward with this project would significantly undermine our
ability to continue leading the world in combatting climate
change.”64 In the months leading up to the final determination,
57. Office of the Spokesperson, Denial of the Keystone XL Pipeline Application, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 18, 2012), https://bit.ly/30xFPQ3 [https://perma.cc/
6V5Z-N8UL].
58. Id. This Congressional deadline illustrates the controversy that marked
every step of the KXL’s progress. In the fall of 2011, large protests at the White
House called for President Obama to deny the KXL permit, arguing it would further fossil fuel dependence and increase greenhouse gas emissions. Daniel Stone,
Obama Delays Keystone Pipeline at Least 12 Months, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 10,
2011), http://bit.ly/3qeiywK. Shortly after the protests, the State Department announced that it would need more time to study the environmental impact of the
project, with a decision likely in early 2013. George Zornick, Keystone XL Is Back
on the Table—for Now, THE NATION (Dec. 17, 2011), http://bit.ly/3c3zSzc [https://
perma.cc/NPP3-6BPC]. Republicans in Congress who supported the KXL were
unhappy with the delay and inserted a 60-day deadline for the permit decision into
a bill which extended payroll tax cuts. Id. The State Department followed the enacted deadline, announcing its decision to deny the KXL’s permit on January 18,
2012. Office of the Spokesperson, Denial of the Keystone XL Pipeline Application, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 18, 2012), https://bit.ly/30xFPQ3 [https://perma.cc/
LH7E-4FDW].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. SEIS, supra note 16, at S-3.
62. Id.
63. John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Determination, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2015), https://bit.ly/35JKYq8 [https://perma.cc/
R88H-WTYM].
64. Id.
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public controversy around the KXL had grown, with voices speaking out on both sides of the debate.65 The KXL became a focal
point for the larger national conversation concerning climate
change.66 The State Department received “nearly five million public comments” while reviewing the KXL application.67 Environmentalists celebrated the denial as a key victory in the fight against
climate change and declared the project dead.68
Yet even as the Obama administration was halting the bordercrossing leg of the Keystone Pipeline System, it was greenlighting
TC Energy’s completion of its southern leg.69 Known as the Gulf
Coast Pipeline, this 487-mile section of 36-inch crude oil pipeline
connected Cushing, Oklahoma, to the Gulf Coast in Texas.70 Despite the ongoing KXL controversy, the southern leg’s completion
marked a key moment in the export of oil sands oil.71 Oil sands oil
flowed directly from the Hardisty, Alberta fields to the Gulf Coast
for the first time in January 2014.72 President Obama’s address authorizing the Gulf Coast Pipeline contrasted Secretary Kerry’s rejection of the KXL’s presidential permit.73 President Obama
endorsed the Gulf Coast Pipeline because it represented American
energy development; specifically, the project supported the oil
fields of South Dakota and Colorado.74 President Obama’s policy
tried to strike a balance between energy independence and conservation.75 But this focus would change when a new energy policy
entered the White House following the election of President Donald Trump, and the KXL’s presidential permit was quickly
revived.76
65. See, e.g., Brad Plumer, 9 Questions About the Keystone XL Pipeline Debate You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask, VOX (Sept. 22, 2015), https://bit.ly/
3jzMfVv [https://perma.cc/Z8QY-U47C].
66. Id.
67. John Kerry, U.S. Sec’y of State, Keystone XL Pipeline Permit Determination, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 6, 2015), https://bit.ly/35JKYq8 [https://perma.cc/
BPG2-T9F9].
68. Ben Adler, The Inside Story of the Campaign that Killed Keystone XL,
VOX (Nov. 7, 2015), https://bit.ly/33xGRNr [https://perma.cc/2AUX-5VES].
69. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President on AmericanMade Energy, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Mar. 22, 2012), https://bit.ly/35SWks1
[https://perma.cc/JXJ8-327U].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline: Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Interior, 82
Fed. Reg. 8663 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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c. The Trump Administration, E.O. 13783, and Shifting Energy
Policy
With a new administration in 2017 came a new energy policy
and renewed interest in the route of the KXL. On January 24, 2017,
just days after his inauguration, President Trump issued a “Presidential Memorandum Regarding Construction of the Keystone XL
Pipeline.”77 In it, he specifically invited TC Energy to apply for a
new presidential permit.78 President Trump also directed the State
Department to expedite the review of an application upon arrival.79
TC Energy resubmitted its permit application two days later.80 In
March 2017, a State Department presidential permit greenlit the
KXL for the first time.81
The KXL approval was part of a larger domestic energy policy.
On March 28, 2017, President Trump issued E.O. 13783: Promoting
Energy Independence and Economic Growth.82 Paired with his encouragement of the construction of the KXL, this E.O. signaled a
shift in American energy policy away from climate concerns and in
favor of accelerated domestic fossil fuel resources development.83
77. Id.
78. Id at 8663.
79. Id. The President also addressed the Secretary of the Interior, Directors of
the Bureau of Land Management and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.
Id at 8664. President Trump singled out the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”), ordering:
The Secretary of the Army shall . . . take all actions necessary and appropriate to review and approve as warranted, in an expedited manner, requests for authorization to utilize Nationwide Permit 12 under section
404(e) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(e), with respect to crossings of the “waters of the United States” by the Keystone XL Pipeline, to
the maximum extent permitted by law.
Id.
80. SEIS, supra note 16, at S-2.
81. Id.
82. Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
83. Executive Order 13783: Energy Development, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Oct. 30, 2017), https://bit.ly/3kNLJ7O [https://perma.cc/
8QQL-VPE4]. Within E.O. 13783 was an explicit directive:
The heads of agencies shall review all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions . . . that
potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources.
Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 28, 2017). The Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Commerce, and
the Department of the Interior all released responsive reports to the E.O. within
months of its issuance. Executive Order 13783: Energy Development, HARV. L.
SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Oct. 30, 2017), https://bit.ly/3kNLJ7O
[https://perma.cc/8QQL-VPE4]. The E.O. has been the source of many environmental “deregulatory actions” within those agencies. Id. See id. for an account of
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3. Permitted Yet Paused
Nearly a decade after filing its initial application, TC Energy
had finally secured the presidential permit needed to begin constructing the KXL. However, TC Energy remained unable to begin
meaningful construction of the KXL.84 Environmental groups and
Native American tribes immediately began a series of challenges to
the KXL’s presidential permit, delaying construction.85 These suits
focused on the State Department’s level of review conducted prior
to issuing the presidential permit.86
The environmental suits alleged that the State Department’s
environmental review was inadequate.87 In Indigenous Environmental Network v. United States Department of State, environmental
groups won an initial victory.88 The district judge required the State
Department to supplement its 2014 environmental review to consider the impacts of a reroute.89 A related suit culminated in a November 2018 injunction issued from the Montana District Court,
which halted the KXL’s construction altogether.90
the Trump administration’s environmental regulation rollbacks linked to E.O.
13783.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. One such lawsuit challenged the sufficiency of the entire Presidential
Permit review process. In September 2018, two Native American tribes sued the
State Department, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, and the Fort Belknap Indian Community. Vanessa Romo, Native American Tribes File Lawsuit Seeking To Invalidate
Keystone XL Pipeline Permit, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 10, 2018), https://n.pr/
2VcN78P [https://perma.cc/C4CS-ZRXA]. Their suit cited failure to analyze KXL
impacts on treaty rights and cultural sites, and the impact of potential spills on
their communities in violation of NEPA and the National Historic Preservation
Act. Id. It called for rescission of the KXL’s Presidential Permit pending adequate
review. Id.
87. See, e.g., Indigenous Env’t Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 317 F.3d
1123–24 (D. Mont. 2018).
88. Id.
89. Id. TC Energy was forced to reroute its line in Nebraska to gain approval
from the Nebraska Public Service Commission (“NPSC”). Id. The new route
sought to reduce environmental impacts of the pipeline. The State Department’s
approval of the KXL’s permit, however, relied on its previously prepared 2014
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). SEIS, supra note 16, at S-2. Because
the NPSC approval hinged on a reroute, the 2014 EIS no longer included analysis
of the actual route of the KXL through Nebraska. Id. at S-3. Environmental
groups alleged the failure to adequately review the environmental impacts of the
current route violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). Keystone
XL Pipeline, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM, https://bit.ly/2JnbNsy
[https://perma.cc/TAP9-GR4M] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
90. Keystone XL Pipeline, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM,
https://bit.ly/2JnbNsy [https://perma.cc/B7JA-EMQX] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
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Crucially, the injunctive order took issue with the shift in policy between the Obama and Trump administrations.91 It called for
the State Department to defend, with data, its reversal of the
Obama administration’s climate change findings.92 The order required “the State Department to revisit key aspects of its NEPA
analysis before pipeline construction [could] begin, including reassessing and further explaining its analysis of cumulative greenhouse
gas emissions.”93 The injunction paused “all preconstruction and
construction activities for the pipeline.”94 Despite appeals filed by
both TC Energy and the Trump administration, the injunction continued to prevent all but peripheral construction activities on the
KXL through March 2019.95
4. Presidential Permit: Take Two
In March 2019, President Trump took matters into his own
hands and circumvented the ongoing litigation surrounding the
KXL’s presidential permit. On March 29, 2019, President Trump
issued a new presidential permit for the KXL.96 President Trump
simultaneously revoked the 2017 permit and instated a new permit
in its place.97 It relied solely upon President Trump’s own authority
as President for its issuance.98 The new KXL permit no longer expressly involved the State Department, which was the named government defendant in the legal actions by tribes and environmental
groups against the original KXL permit.99 Consequently, on June 6,
91. Karl Puckett, Judge Blocks Construction of Keystone XL Pipeline, GREAT
FALLS TRIBUNE (Nov. 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/3o9FMTP [https://perma.cc/F89HEKH5].
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The injunction was amended on February 15, 2019, to allow minor construction activities outside of the main route “such as work on pipe storage and
container yards.” Id.
96. See Authorizing TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P., To Construct, Connect, Operate, and Maintain Pipeline Facilities at the International Boundary Between the United States and Canada, 84 Fed. Reg. 13101 (Apr. 3, 2019).
97. Id at 13101. (“By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the
United States of America, I hereby grant permission, subject to the conditions
herein set forth, to TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, L.P.”).
98. Joshua Axelrod, Keystone XL Gets a Win–But the Fight Goes On, NAT.
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (June 11, 2019), https://on.nrdc.org/37a0MD2 [https://
perma.cc/7952-QSLL].
99. Keystone XL Pipeline, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM,
https://bit.ly/2JnbNsy [https://perma.cc/CD9D-ANXE] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
Interestingly, the State Department continued its environmental review despite
the new Presidential Permit and published its Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement for the KXL in October 2019. SEIS, supra note 16.
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2019, the Ninth Circuit dismissed as moot the November 2018 injunction blocking construction of the KXL.100
This development came too late for construction to begin on
the KXL in 2019.101 By May 2019, a TC Energy executive acknowledged to investors that delays due to legal challenges caused the
company to miss the 2019 construction season.102 With legal challenges to the KXL’s original presidential permit now moot, environmental groups turned to other linchpins to halt construction of
the KXL.103 TC Energy readied to begin construction.
By mid-2019, construction of the KXL was finally green lit, although TC Energy could not start breaking ground until the 2020
construction season.104 President Trump’s unilateral issuance of a
new presidential permit mooted the initial round of lawsuits challenging approval of the project.105 Following this, negotiations with
state agencies finalized the pipeline’s route.106 However, TC Energy still needed to navigate the logistical network of the remaining
state and federal permits necessary for construction of the
pipeline.107
B. Federal Oversight of Interstate Oil Pipelines
1. A Fragmented Federal Framework
Although states play a role in pipeline construction regulation,
this Comment focuses on the regulations affecting oil pipelines at
the federal level. Direct federal oversight of oil pipelines in the
100. See Indigenous Env’t Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:17-cv-00029,
2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 17095 (D. Mont. June 6, 2019) (order granting motion to
dismiss district court’s injunction as moot).
101. Court Delays Block Keystone XL Pipeline Construction in 2019, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/3o4iFKr [https://perma.cc/639J-YT2N].
102. Id.
103. Joshua Axelrod, Keystone XL Gets a Win–But the Fight Goes On, NAT.
RES. DEF. COUNCIL (June 11, 2019), https://on.nrdc.org/37a0MD2 [https://
perma.cc/FD95-5WE8]. At least one lawsuit against the new presidential permit
challenged the constitutionality of the permit. See Indigenous Env’t Network v.
Trump, 4:19-cv-00028-BMM 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192451 (D. Mont. 2020).
104. Court Delays Block Keystone XL Pipeline Construction in 2019, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/3o4iFKr [https://perma.cc/639J-YT2N].
105. Keystone XL Pipeline, HARV. L. SCH. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM,
https://bit.ly/2JnbNsy [https://perma.cc/2RZE-ACQY] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
106. SEIS, supra note 16, at S-3.
107. See Brandon J. Murrill, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY
AUTHORITY (2016) (summarizing extensively the various state and federal agencies involved in permitting natural gas and oil pipelines).
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United States consists mainly of pipeline safety concerns.108 The
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(“PHMSA”) produces and enforces federal safety standards for interstate oil pipelines.109 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) also has limited oversight of interstate oil pipelines,
which focuses on fair competition practices.110 FERC regulates the
transportation rates companies charge, “ensuring that there are
‘equal service conditions’ such that shippers have equal access to
pipeline transportation.”111 Neither PHMSA nor FERC direct siting of oil pipelines.112
Indeed, unless the federal government is the landowner, state
and local authorities—not the federal government—oversee siting
for crude oil pipelines.113 Factors like land ownership, geography,
and cultural resources dictate the necessary state and local authorizations.114 There is no centralized federal authority that administers
oil pipeline construction, but pipelines still require federal permits
or authorizations for many aspects of their construction.115 Without
a centralized federal administrator, these authorizations proceed in
piecemeal fashion.116 A significant intersection between pipeline
108. Catherine Little, Regulation of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines: A Legal
Primer, 235 PIPELINE & GAS JOURNAL 124 (2008), https://bit.ly/2HOSfNr [https://
perma.cc/3DCJ-WMAY]. Interstate oil pipeline safety is overseen by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (“PHMSA”), through the Office of Pipeline Safety. Id.
109. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44201, DOT’S FEDERAL PIPELINE SAFETY PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2019).
110. Catherine Little, Regulation of Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines: A Legal
Primer, 235 PIPELINE & GAS JOURNAL 124 (2008), https://bit.ly/2HOSfNr [https://
perma.cc/3DCJ-WMAY]. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, FERC regulates
oil pipeline companies as “common carriers.” Id.
111. Id.
112. BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 8 (2016).
113. Id. at 7. The Department of the Interior (“DOI”), under authority from
the Mineral Leasing Act, grants rights-of-ways (“ROWs”) and oversees most pipeline routing through federal lands. Id. Where other federal agencies have jurisdiction, they coordinate with DOI to develop ROWs. Id. “The Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) within DOI has promulgated regulations governing various
aspects of oil or natural gas pipeline ROW, including requirements as to which
lands are available for ROW; qualifications for holding a ROW; and terms and
conditions on holding ROW.” Id. An oil pipeline that crosses international borders
requires a Presidential Permit. Id. at 9. In contrast, FERC does exercise siting authority over natural gas pipelines, overseeing the “siting, construction, and operation of natural gas pipelines.” Id.
114. Id. at 8.
115. Id.
116. BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULA-
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construction and federal regulations materializes when pipelines
cross waters that fall under federal jurisdiction.117 These water
crossings are at the heart of the ongoing litigation over the KXL.118
2. Section 404 Permitting Under the Clean Water Act
Pipelines like the KXL, which traverse hundreds of miles, pass
over countless bodies of water as they snake their way to their destinations.119 Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),
the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) is the gatekeeper of those
crossings.120 Section 404 Permits regulate activities that may discharge “dredged or fill material” into jurisdictional waters.121 However, not all waters fall under the Corps’ jurisdiction.122
The CWA “established federal jurisdiction over ‘navigable waters,’ defined in the act as ‘waters of the United States’”
(“WOTUS”).123 The definition of WOTUS is codified at 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3 as:
(1) The territorial seas, and waters which are currently used, or
were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate
or foreign commerce, including waters which are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide; (2) Tributaries; (3) Lakes and ponds,
and impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and (4) Adjacent
wetlands.124
TORY AUTHORITY 8 (2016). For example, pipelines that discharge pollutants into
waters of the United States must obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System permits. Id. at 15. Clean Air Act permits are necessary for emissions from
the “construction and operation of facilities related to pipeline transportation, such
as stations or pumps that move natural gas or oil through pipelines.” Id. at 17.
117. Id. at 12.
118. Id.
119. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 1993.
120. Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2018).
121. Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY
(June 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/3q5rYvs [https://perma.cc/S9EC-8QHC].
122. Id.
123. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Permitting Discharges of Dredge or
Fill Material, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY (Sept. 16, 2020), https://bit.ly/3jsv09t
[https://perma.cc/2Q6R-L4Y4].
124. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. The codified definition also includes a list of waters
that are not WOTUS. Id. This definition is the product of recent rulemaking, finalized on June 22, 2020. Farris Gillman, WOTUS Redefined: The New Definition of
Waters of the United States, JDSUPRA (Apr. 23, 2020), https://bit.ly/2VmhWI5
[https://perma.cc/V73S-MWNM]. The initial permits at issue in this Comment were
issued under an earlier WOTUS definition, promulgated by the EPA and the
Corps in 2015. Id. That definition included:
(1) waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be
susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; (2) interstate waters and
wetlands; (3) the territorial seas; (4) impoundments of waters otherwise
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The Corps makes the final call on whether jurisdiction is implicated.125 Section 404 permits are commonly required for construction activities “where the filling in of a waterbody occurs as a
necessary element of the project,” such as oil pipelines.126 Section
404 permits themselves fall into two categories—individual or
general.127
Before Congress amended the CWA in 1977, the Corps authorized every Section 404 Permit individually.128 The 1977 amendments created a general permitting option for the Corps and
allowed applicants to engage in Section 404 activities without individual review of a project or its environmental effects.129 The Corps
can issue general permits for:
[A]ny category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill
material if . . . the activities in such category are similar in nature,
will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.130

The Corps issues general permits on a five-year basis, at which
point the permits must be reissued or they will expire.131 The three
most common general permit forms are nationwide, regional, or
identified as jurisdictional; (5) tributaries of the first three categories; and
(6) adjacent waters.
Id. The rule also allowed for evaluation, “on a case-by-case basis,” of other waters,
such as “isolated waters that are not connected to navigable waters but are ecologically important.” See id. (summarizing the differences between the old and new
rules).
125. Permit Program Under CWA Section 404, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY
(June 17, 2020), https://bit.ly/3q5rYvs [https://perma.cc/DN6L-2YU5]. The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) is also involved in the Section 404 program,
including through its role enforcing the CWA and consulting with the Corps on
individual permit applications. Id.
126. CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31411, CONTROVERSIES
OVER REDEFINING “FILL MATERIAL” UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 3 (2013).
127. Captain Nathan R. Menard, Creek on a Leash: A Primer on the Clean
Water Act’s Section 404, 4 ARMY L. 29, 31 (2019). Another path for Section 404
permitting is securing a “letter of permission” from a district engineer. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Permitting Process Information, DEP’T OF THE ARMY CORPS
OF ENG’RS, https://bit.ly/35U8wJE [https://perma.cc/RL44-KH7T] (last visited
Aug. 25, 2021). (“Letters of permission may be used where, in the opinion of the
district engineer, the proposed work would be minor, would not have significant
individual or cumulative impacts on environment values, and should encounter no
appreciable opposition.”).
128. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 1997.
129. Id.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (1987).
131. N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 454 F. Supp. 3d
985, 987 (D. Mon. 2020).
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programmatic general permits.132 Nationwide permits (“NWP”) operate on a national basis, while regional general permits and
programmatic general permits operate on a regional or state basis,
respectively.133
The Corps’ NWP program consists of over 50 permits, each
overseeing a common activity.134 The Corps designed the program
to simplify and accelerate Section 404 permitting.135 NWPs are issued every five years through rulemaking rather than in response to
individual applications.136 Because of this procedure, the environmental review, including substantive CWA compliance and procedural NEPA analysis, is completed periodically at the issuance
stage.137 Applicants using NWPs seek verification “that a project
satisfies the previously issued NWP’s requirements” before commencing with projects.138
While the Corps designed the NWP program to expedite pipeline construction, weaknesses in the program have frustrated that
purpose.139 In recent years, the anti-KXL movement set its sights
132. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Permitting Process Information, DEP’T OF
ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, https://bit.ly/35U8wJE [https://perma.cc/8PMC7SS8] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021). Regional and programmatic general permits differ in purpose rather than geographic scope. Id. While the Corps issues regional
general permits that cover a distinguishable region, programmatic general permits
allow another agency (state, local, tribal, or federal) to issue an equivalent Section
404 permit to avoid duplicating regulatory duties. Id.
133. Id.
134. Proposal to Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,298, 57,304–05 (Sept. 15, 2020).
135. Id.
136. Id. A full NWP reissuance took place in March 2017, with fifty-two separate NWPs issued. Nationwide Permit Information, DEP’T OF THE ARMY CORPS OF
ENG’RS, http://bit.ly/3qYhFZZ [https://perma.cc/7N35-CS6V] (last visited Aug. 25,
2021). Like other general permits, nationwide permits group similar activities into
categories, such as NWP 6 for “survey activities,” and NWP 17 “hydropower
projects.” Proposal to Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,298, 57,299 (Sept. 15, 2020). The 2017 NWPs were set to expire on March 18,
2022. Id. However, a proposed rulemaking in September 2020 sped up that time
frame to comply with the policy directives of E.O. 13783 of March 2017. Id. The
E.O. charged agencies with studying and streamlining regulations to encourage development of domestic energy resources. Id. According to the Corps, the proposed
rulemaking is a fulfillment of that order. Id. On March 15, 2021, this latest
rulemaking went into effect, with the Corps “reissuing and modifying 12 existing
NWPs and issuing four new NWPs.” Nationwide Permit Information, DEP’T OF
THE ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://bit.ly/3qYhFZZ [https://perma.cc/FAN45ZPL] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
137. Proposal to Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,298, 57,355–56 (Sept. 15, 2020).
138. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 1997.
139. BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44432, PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION OF NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL: FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 8 (2016).
THE
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on the Corps’ nationwide permit used in pipeline construction, Nationwide Permit 12.140
III.

ANALYSIS

Nationwide Permit 12 (“NWP 12”) is commonly used to permit
oil pipeline water crossings.141 Recent Corps practice relies on separate NWP 12s for each water crossing rather than a single individual
permit for the pipeline as a whole, even for pipelines like the KXL
that stretch hundreds of miles.142 Corps rulemaking treats each
water crossing as a separate project, in effect allowing the Corps “to
evade whole-pipeline review.”143 By contrast, an individual permit
triggers whole-pipeline review, which would in turn consider the cumulative effects of those crossings.144
A. The Rise of Nationwide Permit 12
The shift in reliance on NWP 12 for major pipeline projects
began in 2012.145 That year, President Obama issued a Presidential
Memorandum in response to anticipated pipeline bottlenecks created by increased domestic oil production.146 The Memorandum directed agencies:
140. See Christin Rideout Schirra et al., U.S. Supreme Court Limits Nationwide Permit 12 Injunction to Keystone XL Pipeline, BRICKER & ECKLER ATT’YS
AT L. (July 7, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Gwkv6o [https://perma.cc/94JF-RQ26].
141. Id. at 2004. Under the 2017 reissuance of NWP 12, the permit encompassed the broad category of “utility line activities,” including oil and gas pipelines,
electric utility lines, and telecommunication utility lines. CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97233, THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ NATIONWIDE PERMITS PROGRAM: ISSUES
AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2017) [hereinafter ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS]. “[A] ‘utility line’ is defined as any pipe or pipeline for the
transportation of any gaseous, liquid, liquescent, or slurry substance, for any purpose of electrical energy, telephone, and telegraph messages, and radio and television communications.” Id. On March 21, 2021, the Corps reissued NWP 12 with a
narrowed scope. Reissuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 86 Fed. Reg.
2,744, 2,744 (Jan. 13, 2021). NWP 12 now governs solely “oil or natural gas pipeline
activities.” Id. Two new NWPs were created to cover the utility line activities now
excluded from NWP 12: NWP 57 will “authorize elective utility line and telecommunications activities” and NWP 58 will authorize “utility line activities for water
and other substances.” Id. at 2,769.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Re: Comments on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Proposal to Reissue
and Modify Nationwide Permit 12, Docket No. COE-2015-0017, SIERRA CLUB
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://bit.ly/3jEVwwc [https://perma.cc/E9P6-AL3T].
146. Presidential Memorandum Expediting Review of Pipeline Projects from
Cushing, Oklahoma to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Domestic Pipeline Infrastructure Projects (Mar. 22, 2012), http://bit.ly/3ctWxXz [https://perma.cc/9RDVMEH3].
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[T]o the maximum extent practicable and consistent with available resources and applicable laws . . . [to] coordinate and expedite their reviews, consultations, and other processes as necessary
to expedite decisions related to domestic pipeline infrastructure
projects that would contribute to a more efficient domestic pipeline system for the transportation of crude oil, such as a pipeline
from Cushing to Port Arthur.147

Following this Memorandum, the Corps’ practices changed.148
For example, the Corps issued 2,227 separate NWP 12 permits for
the 485-mile-long Gulf Coast Pipeline’s water crossings rather than
using an individual permit and thereby completing whole-pipeline
review.149 The Corps followed the same protocol for the Flanagan
South Pipeline, which runs 593 miles from Pontiac, Illinois to Cushing, Oklahoma, using NWP 12 for its 1,950 water crossings.150 This
shift to using NWP 12 for major pipeline projects intended to fasttrack pipeline permitting, so that infrastructure buildout could keep
pace with growing oil production.151
The disparity between the financial and time burdens of NWP
versus individual permits encourages companies to use NWP 12.152
Section 404 permits add enormous costs to construction, with more
than 1.7 billion dollars “spent each year by the public and private
sectors obtaining wetlands permits.”153 Compliance is not optional—the CWA imposes criminal liability and civil fines on those
who act without authorization.154 An independent 2002 study found
that “[t]he average applicant for an individual permit spends 788
days and $271,596 in completing the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 313 days and $28,915—not
147. Id.
148. Re: Comments on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Proposal to Reissue
and Modify Nationwide Permit 12, Docket No. COE-2015-0017, SIERRA CLUB
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://bit.ly/3jEVwwc [https://perma.cc/5BRC-BBVM].
149. Id. The Gulf Coast Pipeline is the Southern leg of the Keystone Pipeline,
which runs from Cushing to Port Arthur. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks
by the President on American-Made Energy, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Mar. 22,
2012), https://bit.ly/35SWks1 [https://perma.cc/9CX9-FDLA].
150. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2004.
151. Emily Pontecorvo, This Federal Permit Used to Fast-Track Pipelines.
Now it’s Threatening Them., GRIST (July 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3jrJruk [https://
perma.cc/9RWU-KBX3]; Presidential Memorandum Expediting Review of Pipeline Projects from Cushing, Oklahoma to Port Arthur, Texas, and Other Domestic
Pipeline Infrastructure Projects (Mar. 22, 2012), http://bit.ly/3ctWxXz [https://
perma.cc/9LMM-R5AV].
152. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 3.
153. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006).
154. Id.
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counting costs of mitigation or design changes.”155 According to
Corps data from 2016, the average processing time for nationwide
and general permits was 40 days, while individual permit processing
averaged 217 days.156 The economy of NWP 12 undoubtedly makes
it attractive to the Corps and industry alike, but practice limits
NWP 12’s appeal.157
B. Functions and Disfunctions of NWP 12
Like all NWPs, the Corps conducts environmental review for
NWP 12 at its five-year issuance interval.158 Once issued, use of
NWP 12 requires only verification from the Corps that proposed
activities are within NWP 12’s scope.159 At the point of verification,
the Corps uses a system of pre-construction notices (“PCN”) and
general conditions to trigger further review if proposed activities
risk having more than minimal environmental impact.160 Pipelines
require a separate NWP 12 for each water crossing, meaning a single pipeline may use NWP 12 thousands of times.161 By only regulating water crossings, NWP 12 use results in only a small
percentage of a pipeline’s construction falling under Corps’
jurisdiction.162
1. Unpredictable Project-Level Environmental Review
The Corps undertakes environmental review of NWP 12 when
it periodically reissues the permit.163 The Corps predicts the environmental impact of future NWP 12 use under both the CWA and
NEPA.164 The CWA analysis requires that all activities authorized
155. Id.
156. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 2.
157. See id. at 7–8.
158. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 1997.
159. Id.
160. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 8. A PCN
is “a brief document that is intended to provide the Corps district engineer with
enough information to determine whether an activity may be authorized by a nationwide permit. Project-specific information must be submitted, but detailed studies or analyses are not required.” Id. at 4 n.8. Proposed activities trigger PCNs
under certain conditions, such as discharges that “result in the loss of greater than
1/10-acre of waters of the United States.” Id. at 3. NWPs contain PCN thresholds
tailored to the permitted activity. Id. at 4. General conditions function like PCNs
but apply to some or all NWPs. Id. at 3. For example, General Condition 18 requires further review where activities may impact endangered species. Id. at 9.
161. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2003. For example, the Gulf Coast Pipeline
required 2,227 NWP 12s for its 2,227 water crossings. Id. at 2004.
162. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 8.
163. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 1993.
164. Id.
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under NWP 12 have “no more than minimal individual and cumulative adverse environmental effects” on the impacted aquatic environment.165 The NEPA review is broader.166 The Corps’ NEPA
review of NWP 12 must consider “reasonably foreseeable cumulative effects” that will arise during the lifespan of NWP 12’s issuance.167 This means the Corps performs hypothetical rather than
actual project-level CWA and NEPA analysis.168 Projects using
NWP 12 only undergo verification that activities are within the
scope of the permit, not specific CWA and NEPA analysis.169
The Corps defends this environmental review process, arguing
that the ease of NWP 12 encourages project developers to minimize
environmental effects to qualify to use NWP 12.170 However, there
is little data to support the Corps’ assertion that environmental effects are minimized. In fact, the environmental effects may evade
notice all together under this system.171 A decision document accompanies each reissuance of NWP 12, detailing the environmental
review conducted and outlining the anticipated usage and impacts
associated with the permit.172 NWP 12’s decision document does
not include definitive retrospective data disclosing the number of
times NWP 12 was actually used during its previous issuance, nor
does it detail the amount of WOTUS actually affected.173 The Corp
does not otherwise keep track of this data in a comprehensive public database.174 Without data to review, NWP 12’s purported neutral environmental impacts are not verifiable.175
Another controversial NWP 12 feature is its reliance on compensatory mitigation to offset more than minimal environmental effects of its usage.176 Where activities result in the loss of more than
165. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, DECISION DOCUNATIONWIDE PERMIT 12, at 3 (2017).
166. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2001.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 3.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id. at 9.
173. Id. The decision document does include some estimated data, including
estimates of average yearly use of the NWP, broken down by whether they triggered PCNs. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 11. Compensatory mitigation is “the restoration, establishment, enhancement, or in certain circumstances preservation of wetlands, streams or other
aquatic resources for the purpose of offsetting unavoidable adverse impacts.” Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://bit.ly/3crGglV
[https://perma.cc/V5F5-V37V] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
MENT:
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1/10-acre of wetlands, a PCN is triggered, requiring district engineer
verification and compensatory mitigation to replace the lost
“aquatic resource function.”177 Environmentalists argue that the
Corps’ reliance on compensatory mitigation violates the CWA by
allowing more than minimal effects on aquatic resources.178 In fact,
government studies have shown that “mitigation is not fully successful and does not compensate for wetlands lost to permitted
fills.”179 On the other hand, the industry argues that compensatory
mitigation should not be so rigidly required and that waivers should
be available to allow for other forms of mitigation, not simply compensatory.180 As it stands, the Corps’ use of compensatory mitigation fails to satisfy environmentalists or industry.181
Along with mitigation requirements, NWP 12 use remains subject to the discretion of district engineers through use of PCNs and
other permit-specific conditions.182 When an application triggers a
PCN, a district engineer gets involved and may review plans and
impose conditions to “ensure that they will cause no more than
minimal adverse environmental effects, individually and cumulatively.”183 If the district engineer takes no action within 45 days, the
activity is automatically authorized in all but 2 cases.184 This process
leads to industry frustration, as individual review of NWP 12 activity seems to conflict with the streamlining purpose behind the NWP
program.185 However, the Corps relies on these PCNs and conditions as a check against more than “minimal adverse environmental
177. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 11.
178. Id. at 12.
179. Id. at 11.
180. Id. at 12.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 8.
183. Proposal to Reissue and Modify Nationwide Permits, 85 Fed. Reg.
57,299, 57,300 (Sept. 15, 2020).
184. Id. The two exceptions are activities “conducted by non-Federal permittees that require PCNs under . . . the ‘Endangered Species’ and ‘Historic Properties’ general conditions.” Id.
185. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 8. In a
landmark Supreme Court case concerning the definition of WOTUS, Justice Scalia
issued a scathing review of the discretion at the heart of PCNs, and the conditions
district engineers may require on NWPs:
The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill material
in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is not trivial. In
deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened despot, relying
on such factors as “economics,” “aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general, the needs and welfare of the people.”
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006).
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effects.”186 This reliance raises the question of whether activities
truly fall within the scope of NWP 12 if imposing conditions is necessary to prevent environmental harms. Upon review, district engineers can require a switch to an individual rather than a nationwide
permit if they determine effects could be more than minimal.187 Because PCN review is highly discretionary, industry and environmentalists alike criticize the system.188 Both sides lament that
inconsistent enforcement coupled with ambiguous guidelines results
in inadequate administrative records and unpredictable
oversight.189
2. Lack of Project-Level Public Input
Because NEPA review is completed at NWP 12’s issuance
stage, there is no public comment period for projects that use NWP
12.190 Under both NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act,
agencies may not undertake major federal actions without public
input.191 Yet, the verification of project-level NWP 12 permits occurs behind closed doors, negotiated privately between district engineers and project applicants.192 Courts have upheld this process,
deferring to the Corps and not requiring project-level NEPA review.193 This precedent allows major pipeline construction to carry
on without public scrutiny.194
Despite the disparity between the timing of public input and
the effects of permit verification, the public remains interested in
NWP 12.195 In response to the proposed NWP program issuance in
September 2020, the Corps received over 22,700 public comments.196 Members of the public concerned with climate change remain keenly interested in projects like the KXL, which depend on
the use of NWP 12.197 In recent years, these voices are heard
186. Reissuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 86 Fed. Reg. 2,744,
2,745–46 (Jan. 13, 2021).
187. Id.
188. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 10.
189. Id. at 10.
190. Id. at 8.
191. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2020.
192. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 10.
193. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2020.
194. Id. at 2015.
195. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2020.
196. Reissuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 86 Fed. Reg. 2,744,
2,749 (Jan. 13, 2021).
197. See, e.g., Delilah Friedler, Thanks to Trump, Keystone XL is Back. The
Anti-Pipeline Movement is Ready., MOTHER JONES (Feb. 7, 2020), http://bit.ly/
3btk4ad [https://perma.cc/CT43-XKN7].
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through protest and litigation where traditional avenues of public
notice and comment are exhausted or unavailable.198
The lack of public involvement is also problematic because
compliance with NWP 12 relies heavily on the judgment of project
applicants.199 The Corps does not independently verify applications,
but “only responds to information presented in a PCN.”200 Accordingly, companies are trusted to accurately report the presence and
extent of PCNs within project boundaries.201 Reliance on the subjective view of both a private applicant and a reviewing district engineer, with no public input, leaves a void in accountability in the
heart of the NWP program.202
C. Recent NWP 12 Litigation: When Fast-Tracking Slows You
Down
Recent litigation illustrates that reliance on NWP 12 to fasttrack project verification may threaten construction.203 In 2020, a
Ninth Circuit challenge to the KXL’s NWP 12s led to a nationwide
injunction vacating the use of all NWP 12s, not solely the NWP 12s
of the KXL.204
Northern Plains Resource Council (“NPRC”), an environmental nonprofit, alleged the Corps’ 2017 reissuance of NWP 12 violated the CWA, NEPA, and the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”).205 NPRC also specifically challenged the KXL’s Yellowstone and Cheyenne River crossings.206 A Montana district court
judge sided with NPRC, holding that the Corps did not engage in
the necessary consultation required by Section 7 of the ESA.207
Under Section 7 of the ESA, federal agencies must consider
whether proposed actions “may affect” listed species or critical
habitat.208 This determination must happen “at the earliest possible
time.”209 In its 2017 issuance of NWP 12, the Corps independently
198. See id.
199. ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 10.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 2020.
203. Emily Pontecorvo, This Federal Permit Used to Fast-Track Pipelines.
Now it’s Threatening Them., GRIST (July 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3jrJruk [https://
perma.cc/9RWU-KBX3].
204. N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 454 F. Supp. 3d
985, 986–87 (D. Mon. 2020).
205. Id. at 987.
206. Id. at 986.
207. Id. at 993–94.
208. Id. at 989.
209. Id.
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determined that NWP 12 would “have no effect on listed species or
critical habitat.”210 The Corps did not undergo formal programmatic consultation with the National Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) in reaching this conclusion.211 Instead, the Corps justified
the finding through use of General Condition 18 (“GC 18”).212 GC
18 triggers a PCN and requires applicants to notify a district engineer if their proposed activity “‘might’ affect any listed species or
habitat.”213
The district court found this procedure to be inadequate.214
The court held that delaying ESA Section 7 consultation until project-level review violated the ESA.215 The court forecasted that the
delayed timing of this Section 7 analysis could lead to “piecemeal
destruction of species and habitat.”216 The court also found that at
least two endangered species may be affected by the reissuance of
NWP 12.217 Accordingly, the Corps’ NWP 12 reissuance violated
the ESA.218 The district court granted summary judgment to NPRC
on the ESA claim and vacated NWP 12.219
The outcome of this decision had an instantly severe and
sweeping effect on pipeline construction across the United
States.220 On April 15, 2020, the court enjoined the Corps from using NWP 12 to authorize any activities until it fulfilled programmatic consultation under the ESA.221 The Corps and the industry,
including KXL backer TC Energy, appealed this action.222 On May
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 454 F. Supp. 3d
985, 992 (D. Mon. 2020).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 993.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 992.
219. Id. at 996. The court did not reach decisions on NPRC’s CWA or NEPA
claims. Id. The judge did, however, predict that the required ESA consultation
would result in further agency action under the CWA and NEPA. Id. Because that
action could affect the substance of the remaining claims, the court avoided ruling
on them. Id.
220. Id.
221. N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 454 F. Supp. 3d
985, 992 (D. Mon. 2020).
222. N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 460 F. Supp. 3d
1030, 1049 (D. Mon. 2020). TransCanada Keystone Pipeline LP and TC Energy
Corporation, representing the interests of the KXL, were intervenor-defendants in
the original lawsuit. See N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.
4:19-cv-0044, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194114 (D. Mon. Nov. 7, 2019) (order granting motions to intervene). Also intervening as defendants were the “Nationwide
Permit 12 Coalition,” an alliance of five national energy organizations: the Ameri-
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11, 2020, the court amended its order, narrowing the scope of the
injunction to apply only to new construction related to oil and gas
pipelines.223 On July 6, 2020, the United States Supreme Court further limited the district court’s injunction, keeping it in place only
for the KXL pipeline and staying it for all other new oil and gas
pipeline construction.224
As a result of the injunction, the KXL once again lost another
construction season.225 At the end of 2020, KXL construction remained on track in Canada, including a completed international
border crossing between the United States and Canada.226 The progress was short-lived. The harm from the delay in the loss of its
NWP 12 verification foreshadowed the final major blow to the
KXL: President Biden’s cancellation of the KXL’s presidential permit on day one of his presidency.227 Consequently, on June 9, 2021,
TC Energy terminated the KXL project entirely.228
The very permit meant to accelerate pipeline development put
the entire industry at risk.229 The recent trend in reliance on NWP
12 for pipelines with thousands of crossings may not be a viable
long-term strategy. The underlying issues with NWP 12 raised in the
NPRC lawsuit remain unresolved.230 Thorough environmental review with direction and buy-in from the industry could offer a better legal defense than fast-tracking and relying on agency discretion
that shifts with the administration in power.
can Gas Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the Association of Oil
Pipe Lines, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, and the National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Id.
223. N. Plains Res. Council , 460 F. Supp. 3d at 1049 (D. Mon. 2020).
224. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. N. Plains Res. Council, 141 S. Ct. 190
(2020) (Mem.).
225. Rod Nickel, Explainer: What is Happening with the Keystone XL Oil
Pipeline?, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2020), http://reut.rs/3teDNRt [https://perma.cc/
J3PN-RU9R].
226. Id. at 992.
227. Exec. Order No. 13,990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021).
228. TC Energy Confirms Termination of the Keystone XL Pipeline Project,
TC ENERGY (June 9, 2021), https://bit.ly/3CECJLA [https://perma.cc/JTD5QHQR].
229. Emily Pontecorvo, This Federal Permit Used to Fast-Track Pipelines.
Now it’s Threatening Them., GRIST (July 8, 2020), https://bit.ly/3jrJruk [https://
perma.cc/9RWU-KBX3].
230. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, 9th Circ. Finds Keystone Permit Appeal Moot,
LAW360 (Aug. 11, 2021), https://bit.ly/37zO6X1 [https://perma.cc/SEC9-JYNK].
The Ninth Circuit found the case moot on August 11, 2021, holding that the 2021
reissuance of NWP 12 “supersedes the previous [2017] permit” challenged by
NPRC and leaves the court without jurisdiction. Id. The 2021 reissuance of NWP
12 is being challenged by environmental groups in a separate suit. Id.
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D. Embracing Thorough Review of Large-Scale Pipeline Systems
1. The Current Individual Permitting System
Individual permits, as the name suggests, are reviewed case-bycase, with “all authorizations and conditions . . . tailored to the specific project for which the permit is granted.”231 There are three
phases to complete before authorization—“pre-application consultation (for major projects), project review, and decision-making.”232
While the need for an individual permit arises under the CWA, the
permit must also comply with other federal regulations, including
NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Historic
Preservation Act.233 Applicants work closely with the Corps at each
application phase to ensure compliance with these overlapping
regulations.234
In the pre-application phase, informal meetings between the
applicant and the Corps confirm the project’s viability before a formal application is submitted.235 During the review process, the
Corps appoints a single project manager to usher the project application from submission to decision.236 The project manager implements a public notice and comment period for the project,
“negotiates necessary modifications of the project” with the applicant, and creates an administrative record for the project in anticipation of approval.237 The decision-making phase evaluates the
project’s compliance with the CWA’s Section 404(b)(1) guidelines
and determines whether the project is in the public interest.238
231. Captain Nathan R. Menard, Creek on a Leash: A Primer on the Clean
Water Act’s Section 404, 4 ARMY L. 29, 31 (2019).
232. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Permitting Process Information, DEP’T OF
THE ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, https://bit.ly/35U8wJE [https://perma.cc/TV9RQWTA] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
233. Captain Nathan R. Menard, Creek on a Leash: A Primer on the Clean
Water Act’s Section 404, 4 ARMY L. 29, 31 (2019).
234. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Permitting Process Information, DEP’T OF
THE ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, https://bit.ly/35U8wJE [https://perma.cc/85E3A3N5] (last visited Aug. 25, 2021).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. The CWA guidelines govern any permitted “discharges of dredged or
fill material into waters of the United States,” with “no permit . . . granted if the
proposed activity is found to be contrary to the Section 404(b)(1) guidelines.” Id.
CWA permits seek to minimize these discharges, and so “restrict discharges . . .
where less environmentally damaging practicable alternatives exist.” Id. The Corps
outlines its public interest factors as:
(1) The relevant extent of public and private need for the proposed work.
(2) Where unresolved conflicts of resource use exist, the practicability of
using reasonable alternative locations and methods to accomplish the objective of the proposed structure or work; and (3) The extent and perma-
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When issued, permits are accompanied by “permit decision documents,” which detail the findings of the project’s environmental and
public interest reviews and any project-specific evaluation necessary for its specific conditions.239
The Corps’ use of an individual permit to meet its CWA requirements, thereby triggering NEPA, results in whole pipeline review.240 Under the CWA, the Corps must substantively evaluate the
effects that discharges into WOTUS will have on the aquatic environment.241 Under NEPA, the Corps must ensure, through specific
procedures, that the environmental impact of the permit’s issuance
is thoroughly understood.242 The NEPA analysis goes beyond impacts on WOTUS—“the Corps must complete an analysis of all reasonably foreseeable cumulative effects of the permit.”243 NEPA
also allows public input through its required public comment period, recognizing the value of the public perspective in federal decision-making.244
Individual permits require heightened environmental review
but do not limit the total amount of aquatic resources affected
under the permitted activity.245 The Corps argues that increased use
of individual permits would actually lead to a corresponding increase in affected acreage, believing the comparative ease of the
NWP process incentivizes applicants to minimize environmental effects.246 This argument is not supported by data, but the incentive is
working whether or not it results in protection of aquatic resources.247 Industry and the Corps use general permits for the vast
majority of permits issued.248 As a CRS report noted, “between
2012 and 2015, the [Corps] authorized an average of 63,000 activities per year; 97% were authorized by nationwide and other general

nence of the beneficial and/or detrimental effects the proposed structure
or work is likely to have on public and private uses to which the area is
suited.
Id.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Arkfeld, supra note 15, at 1994.
Id. at 2001.
Id. at 1998.
Id. at 2001.
Id. at 1999.
ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 141 at 3.
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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permits.”249 Corps use of NWP 12 rather than individual permits in
recent years is part of that documented trend.250
2. Requiring Individual Permits for Large-Scale Pipelines like the
KXL
It is time to rethink the Corps’ reliance on NWP 12 for major
pipeline projects. Recently, the Corps took a step toward a new
process. The 2021 reissuance of NWP 12 includes a new PCN, which
is triggered by pipeline projects longer than 250 miles.251 While the
new PCN recognizes the need for more thorough review of large
pipeline projects, it does not address the other defects of streamlined permitting, such as public involvement.
Rather than using this 250-mile limit as a PCN trigger, the
Corps should use it as a cutoff for use of NWP 12 altogether.252 A
250-mile limit would allow the Corps to maintain use of NWP 12 for
smaller projects and maintenance, as well as implement a new,
transparent system for large-scale, controversial pipelines such as
the KXL. As demonstrated above, there is already a functioning
system for individual permitting which utilizes NEPA and incorporates public involvement.
Implementing whole-pipeline review of large-scale projects
could also provide a federal foothold on combatting climate
change.253 Much of the controversy surrounding the KXL comes
249. Id.
250. Re: Comments on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Proposal to Reissue
and Modify Nationwide Permit 12, Docket No. COE-2015-0017, SIERRA CLUB
(Aug. 1, 2016), https://bit.ly/3jEVwwc [https://perma.cc/PN83-P6QC].
251. Reissuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 86 Fed. Reg. 2,744,
2,860 (Jan. 13, 2021).
252. In 2021, a pipeline project voluntarily shifted from using NWP 12s to
applying for an individual permit for its water crossings, illustrating the practicality
of this proposal. Maya Weber, Mountain Valley Pipeline Adjusts Permit Approach
After Setbacks at FERC, Court, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 27,
2021), https://bit.ly/3yKHX60 [https://perma.cc/DBG5-DCNN]. The Mountain Valley Pipeline is a proposed 303-mile natural gas pipeline in Virginia and West Virginia. Id. Ongoing legal challenges to its use of NWP 12 stayed completion of
construction in 2020. Id. In response to the stay, Mountain Valley Pipeline LLC
applied for an individual permit from the Corps in early 2021. Id. Because all permitting for the project is secured aside from its water crossing permits, Mountain
Valley believes an individual permit “is the most-efficient path to satisfying objections, completing remaining work in an environmentally responsible and protective manner, and keeping within [its] current budget and schedule.” Id. (quoting
Mountain Valley spokesperson Natalie Cox).
253. See, e.g., Jayni Foley Hein & Natalie Jacewicz, Implementing NEPA in
the Age of Climate Change, 10 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 1, 11 (2020) (arguing
federal agencies can use NEPA to analyze downstream and upstream greenhouse
gas emissions of proposed projects).
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from concerns about the upstream and downstream effects the
pipeline will have on climate change, not simply the environmental
effects of its initial construction.254 Canada, where the KXL began,
has expanded its environmental review on major projects to include
upstream effects.255 United States courts have held that agencies
must take greenhouse gas emissions into consideration during
NEPA analyses.256 Addressing climate change through whole pipeline review would be a first step toward answering the concerns of
the anti-pipeline movement. As the effects of climate change become more acute, the federal government should use every tool on
its belt to address them.
IV. CONCLUSION
Without a centralized federal administrator for oil pipeline
construction, controversial projects are open to challenge at each
phase of authorization. The Corps’ use of NWP 12 provides insight
into the legal vulnerabilities of the current system. By intending to
fast-track pipeline construction, the Corps and TC Energy instead
contributed to the KXL’s recent defeat. This Comment aimed to
place the KXL controversy in context, because the next major pipeline proposed will undoubtedly face similar opposition. President
Biden’s withdrawal of the KXL’s presidential permit left its many
legal issues unresolved.
This Comment advocates for a new path forward for federal
regulation of major oil pipelines. The Corps already has a functioning individual permitting system. The Corps’ reluctance to use individual permits for all pipeline-related construction is
understandable, considering the costs and resources needed to evaluate activity that purports to have no more than minimal environmental impact. Instead, the Corps should impose a 250-mile limit
on NWP 12 use and thereby ensure cumulative environmental review of major oil pipelines, including upstream and downstream effects. Rather than remaining bogged down in unending pipeline
wars, the practical path forward for pipelines should incorporate
community involvement, thorough environmental review, and an
understanding of climate impacts.

254. Melissa Denchak, What is the Keystone Pipeline?, NAT. RES. DEF. COUN(Apr. 7, 2017), https://on.nrdc.org/2GnRREH [https://perma.cc/K52C-2E6D].
255. Jayni Foley Hein & Natalie Jacewicz, Implementing NEPA in the Age of
Climate Change, 10 MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 1, 11 (2020).
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